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G.: Extradition--Habeas Corpus--Petitioner Not a Fugitive From Justic
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Habeas Corpus- PETITioNmn NOT A FuGITIvE
a merchant in West Virginia, gave 8, a broker in
Maryland, a check in payment of a truckload of produce. When the
produce arrived, it was found to be unmerchantable and P stopped
payment on the check. P notified S that payment had been stopped,
and that he would seek an adjustment. Without answering, S presented the check for payment which was refused. S then had P
indicted under a Maryland statute for obtaining goods under false
pretenses, and sought his extradition to that state for trial. Extradition was granted by the Governor of West Virginia. In habeas
corpus proceedings, to test the legality of the extradition, evidence
was introduced showing that the check was not given as instant
payment and that S had, at the time of the transaction in question,
a previous check of P which he was holding. Evidence was also
admitted to show that P had sufficient funds in the drawee bank to
pay one, but not both checks. Held, that P committed no overt act
of crime within the state of Maryland and is not a fugitive from
justice. Boyles v. Hudak.'
EXTRADITION FROM JUSTicE-P,

By statute in West Virginia, it is provided that the accused
shall have an opportunity to test the legality of arrest by application for a writ of habeas corpus.2 Beyond forbidding an inquiry by
the Governor or the courts into the guilt or innocence of the accused,
except as may be involved in identifying that person,3 the statute is
silent as to what inquiries may be proper after formal demand for
extradition. Neither have the courts determined, with any degree
of -exactitude, the scope and limits of such a hearing on habeas
corpus.4 However, an extensive reading of the cases will disclose
that the courts have evolved certain guiding principles by confining
some questions within the boundary of inquiry,5 and excluding
others, which, in general, are either artfully probative of the guilt
1 199 S. E. 5 (W. Va. 1938).

-W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 5, art. 1, § 9 (a). It is to be noted
that this is the West Virginia enactment of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act as adopted in 1937, W. Va. Acts 1937, c. 42. This act is now in effect in
approxmately thirty states.
3 W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 5, art 1, § 9 (k).
4 Notes (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 1411; (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 829; (1936)
10 ST. JOHxs L. RLv. 272. See Biddinger v. Com'r of Police, 245 U. S. 128,
134, 38 S. Ct. 41, 62 L. Ed. 193 (1917).
GThat requisition papers are not in proper form, Ex parte Hubbard, 201
N. C. 472, 160 S. E. 569 (1931); Commonwealth v. McNeil, 75 Pitts. 189
(1927); Ex parte Spears, 88 Cal. 640, 26 Pac. 608 (1891). That he is not the
person named in the requisition, In re Gillis, 38 Wash. 156, 80 Pac. 300 (1905);
of. Stuart v, Johnson, Sheriff, 192 Ark. 757, 94 S. W. (2d) 715 (1936).
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or innocence of the petitioner,0 or offer some extraneous reason why
extradition should be refused.'
Whether or not the courts have power to review the conclusion
of the governor of the asylum state that the person, demanded by
another state, is a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the
United States Constitution,8 is a question which has many times confronted state and federal courts. The courts seem generally agreed
that if an executive warrant for extradition is in proper form, there
is a prima facie case in favor of the demanding state to the effect
9
that the accused is a fugitive from justice from that state. It is
safe to say, however, that a majority of the courts have held that
the executive warrant is not conclusive of that fact, and that it is
competent for the prisoner to show on habeas corpus that he is not
a fugitive from the demanding state, and that, therefore, the warrant of the Governor was improvidently issued. 0
But conceding to the courts the power to review the conclusion
of the Governor, what evidence is necessary to overthrow the prima
facie case created by the executive warrant? That the court should
be clearly satisfied that an error has been committed before setting
1
aside the solemn act of the Governor is clearly settled.2 Thus, it is
uniformly held that where there is a substantial conflict in evidence
6 Courts will not consider the question of present sanity or insanity of the
alleged fugitive. State v. Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, 12 N. E. (2d) 144 (1937);
Drew, Sheriff v. Thaw, 235 UG.S. 432, 35 S. Ct. 137, 59 L. Ed. 302 (1914).
Neither the court nor the governor has jurisdiction to inquire into disputed
questions of fact. Romani v. Meyering, 352 I1. 436, 186 N. E. 150 (1933);
Ex parte Murray, 112 S. C. 342, 99 S. E. 798 (1919). Purpose or motive of
the accused in leaving the demanding state is immaterial. Appleyard v.
Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 27 S. Ct. 122, 51 L. Ed. 161, 7 Ann. Cas. 1073
(1906).
7 Fear of accused that he would not have a fair trial is no defense to extradition, In re Ray, 215 Mich. 156, 183 N. W. 777 (1921). That the prosecution
was instituted in bad faith, or to collect a debt, Leonard v. Zweifel, 171 Ia.
522, 151 N. W. 1054 (1915) ; Barranger v. Baum, 103 Ga. 465, 30 S. E. 524
(1898). Contra: Ez parte Owens, 34 Okla. Crim. 128, 245 Pac. 68 (1926).
That the statute of limitations has run, People v. Baldwin, 341 Ill. 604, 174
N. E. 51 (1930).
8 U. S. CONST. Art. VI, § 2.
9 McNichols v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100, 28 S. Ct. 58 (1907); Williams v.
Robertson, 339 Mo. 34, 95 S. W. (2d) 79 (1936); Lacondra v. Hermann, 343
INI. 608, 175 N. E. 820 (1931).
1o Blake v. Doeppe, 97 W. Va. 203, 124 S. E. 667 (1924); In re Mohr, 73
Ala. 503 (1883); State v. Westhues, 318 Mo. 928, 2 S. W. (2d) 612 (1928);
Strasshehn v. Daily, 221 'U. S. 280, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1911); Notes
(1927) 51 A. L. R. 797, (1929) 61 A. L. R. 715; see Roberts v. Reilly, 116
U. S. 80, 95, 6 S. Ct. 291, 29 L. Ed. 544 (1885). Contra: Grace v. Dogan, 151
Miss. 267, 117 So. 596 (1928); In re Ryan, 15 Misc. 303, 36 N. Y. Supp.
888 (1895).
11 Ez parte Brown, 28 Fed. 653, 654 (N. D. N. Y. 1886).
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as to the petitioner's presence in, or absence from the demanding
state at the time the offense was allegedly committed, the petitioner
is not entitled to his freedom on that issue." But, "if the evidence
be clear and convincing that the accused was not personally in the
demanding state at the time of the commission of the offense
charged, and has committed no prior overt act therein indicative of
an intent to commit the crime, or which can be construed as a step
in the furtherance of the crime afterwards consummated, he should
be discharged."13
A cursory reading of the case of Boyles v. Hudak 4 might lead
to the impression that the West Virginia court has overstepped the
bounds of the statute by actually inquiring into the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. However, it should be remembered that the
question of guilt or innocence, and the question of whether or not
the petitioner is a fugitive from justice may in some cases overlap,
and the former be enveloped as an incident of, and subordinate to
a determination of the latter. A close analysis of the principal
case will clarify this somewhat elusive, but valid distinction.
Ordinarily, a check is given and accepted as payable instantly
on demand, but such is not the situation in the Boyles case. The
proof shows "without controversy"' 5 that the check given in payment of the produce was not intended as instant payment. Where
this fact is not in dispute, or where this fact as shown even by the
evidence of the prosecuting witness, is so overwhelmingly on the
side of the petitioner, it would seem apparent that the warrant for
extradition does not charge the crime of obtaining goods under
false pretenses in the demanding state; consequently, the petitioner
is not a fugitive from justice.
It has been suggested that the courts should be exceedingly
slow to discharge by lwbea" corpus one accused in a sister state of
a crime, else the courts themselves will furnish a shield for the
12 Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 372, 28 S. Ct. 282, 49 L. Ed. 515 (1905);
rn re Banner, 280 N. W. 843 (Neb. 1938).
'13Blake v. Doeppe, 97 W. Va. 203, 201, 124 S. E. 667 (1924) ; of. Getzendanner v. Hliltner, 117 W. Va. 418, 185 S. E. 694 (1936); Comment (1936)
43 W. VA. L. Q. 75.
'4199 S. E. 5 (W. Va. 1938).
15 Id. at 6. It is to be noted that the material fact relied upon for extradition will never be entirely free from controversy, for the prosecuting witness
must positively allege a crime in order to secure the necessary warrant for
extradition, and in West Virginia his demand must be accompanied by an
affidavit made in good faith. W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 5, art 1,
§ 7(b). However, it is submitted that upon hearing on habeas corpus, the
evidence may so conclusively break down the allegations of the prosecuting
witness as to result in a record free from material dispute.
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perpetration of crime. However sound this may be, it cannot be
seriously contended that the Uniform Extradition Act, as adopted
in West Virginia, was intended to reduce our courts to mere ministerial agencies unable to throw safeguards around its citizens.
C. E. G.
TRUSTS-BANKS AND BANKING-SPECIAL DrPOSITS.-In 1931,
P deposited funds with D bank to pay off a deed of trust on lands held
by P, D being also agent for the creditor under the trust deed. No
payments were due upon the indebtedness until 1934. D accepted
the funds, and agreed to apply them as directed, paying interest
on the money by way of paying to the creditor interest on the principal debt during the intervening period. In 1933, D bank became
insolvent, and as the bank had not applied the funds as directed, P
filed suit against the receiver therefor, seeking to impress the funds
in his hands with a trust in his favor in the amount of the deposit.
HelZd, that this being a deposit for a specific purpose, P was entitled
to a preference in the amount of his deposit as the fund had become
impressed with a trust. Henson v. Lamb.'
Although the court refers to the deposit in this case as both a
"special deposit" and a "deposit for a specific purpose", there is,
strictly speaking, a difference between the two, yet courts have generally disregarded this difference. 2 Apparently no question was
raised in the principal case as to whether or not payment to the
bank as agent for the creditor was in fact payment to the creditor.
The principal case sheds further light on the subject of preferences upon insolvency of banks in West Virginia.' In deciding the
case, the court had a choice of adopting either of two views on the
subject. The minority of courts and writers deny the existence of
a trust relationship on these facts,' primarily on the ground that
since the fund deposited is not to be kept separate there is no trust
1199 S. E. 459 (W. Va. 1938).
2 "A special deposit is where the whole contract is that the thing deposited
shall be safely kept, and that identical thing returned to the depositor."
1 MORSE, BANKS & BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 183. On the other hand, "When
money is deposited to pay a specified check drawn or to be drawn, or for any
purpose other than mere safe-keeping, or entry on general account, it is a
specific deposit, and the title remains in the depositor until the bank pays the
person for whom it is intended . . ." Id. at § 185. See also Note (1922)
6 MINN. L. REv. 306.
3 See Comments (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 365; (1937) 43 id. 241; (1938)
44 id. 408.
4 MORSE, BANKS & BANKING § 210; SCOTT, CASSES ON TRUSTS (2d ed. 1931)
55, wherein is a collection of authorities; Fallgatter v. Citizens' National
Bank, 11 F. (2d) 383 (D. C. D. Minn. 1926); Northern Sugar Corp. v. Thomp-
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